

Israeli Territoriality and the Predicament of the Palestinian Public Administration: Obstacles and Opportunities

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Abstract

This study examines the main territorial, political, and economic obstacles facing the development of the Palestinian public administration in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (WB&G) in the post Oslo Accord period. It analyzes the effects of Israeli territorial and non-territorial policies on the viability and performance of the Palestinian public sector en route to statehood. It reviews the different initiatives adopted by the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) to develop and modernize the public management system in the WB&G and how these were jeopardized by Israeli policies that eventually resulted in the current predicament facing the Palestinian polity reflected in the creation of two rival governments, each with a territorial base, raising the specter of institutionalizing the separation between the WB & G to the demise of Palestinian aspirations to build a viable state within the geographic framework of these two areas.

Context and Historical Background

The Palestinian public administration in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (WB&G) is embodied in the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) formed as a byproduct of the Oslo Accords between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel in May 1994. The Accords gave the PNA legislative, executive, and judicial authority, but not sovereignty, in designated parts in the WB&G for an interim period of five years. The PNA is therefore unique in the sense that it is a transitional structure operating under conditions of a military occupation. To fully understand the framework of governance within which the PNA is operating it is important to comprehend the historical process that led to its formation, which in turn requires a thorough understanding of the political, economic, demographic, legal, and territorial contexts that are present in the WB&G.

The 1991 Persian Gulf War and the breakup of the Soviet Union changed the geopolitical order in the Middle East and brought the Palestinian Question back to the spotlight of international politics. In October 1991, a US-Soviet

sponsored peace conference was held in Madrid. After the conference, bilateral negotiations were started between Israel and the surrounding Arab countries, as well as with Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip after they got approval from the PLO. After ten rounds of talks, spread over two years, bilateral talks between Palestinians and Israelis reached a deadlock over the issues of Jerusalem and Jewish settlements.

At the same time that bilateral talks were taking place in Washington, the PLO and Israel were conducting intense behind-the-scenes negotiations in Oslo, Norway. After fifteen sessions of secret talks the two sides were able to reach an agreement. On September 13, 1993, Israel and the PLO signed a Declaration of Principals on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (DOP)¹ that articulated the guidelines of peace negotiations between the two over an interim period of five years.

The DOP stipulated the aim of the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians to be the establishment of “a Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Authority [PISGA], the elected council, for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338,” with the understanding that permanent status negotiations will lead to the implementation of both resolutions. The accord also declared that the “jurisdiction” of the Council or PISGA will cover “West bank and Gaza territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations.”

Moreover, the DOP specified that public elections should take place in the WB&G no later than nine months after the entry into force of the accord. It stipulated that Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank, including those in East Jerusalem, can elect the Council or PISGA which will be responsible for Palestinian autonomy or self-rule in the WB&G for the duration of the interim period.

The DOP stipulated that the five-year transitional period begins upon Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area. And that “Immediately” after withdrawal, the Israeli military government and its “Civil Administration” will transfer authority to the “authorized Palestinians” in five spheres: Education and Culture, Health, Social Welfare, Direct Taxation, and

Tourism. Authority transferred to Palestinians in these spheres was to remain “of preparatory nature until the inauguration of the Council.”

Finally, the remaining issues, including Jerusalem, refugees, Jewish settlements, security arrangements, borders, and relations with neighboring countries, were not covered by the Interim Agreement and were postponed to permanent status negotiations that were planned to start “not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period.”

The implementation of the first phase of the DOP was delayed for few months, but on May 4, 1994, the PLO and Israel reached an agreement in Cairo that gave the PLO and its 24-member Palestinian National Authority (PNA) autonomy over the city of Jericho and parts of the Gaza Strip. On August 29, 1994, the two sides reached an agreement over the terms of “early empowerment” in the above-mentioned five spheres. The transfer of authority in the five spheres was completed on December 1, 1994. In 1995 the PNA’s jurisdiction was extended to major cities in the West Bank pending further Israeli withdrawals in accordance with a schedule stipulated in the Interim Agreement signed in Cairo.²

In January 1996, after a delay of almost two years, the first Palestinian presidential and legislative elections took place resulting in the inauguration of an 88-member legislative council and also the election of Mr. Yasir Arafat as the President of the PNA.

The implementation of the Interim Agreement faced major obstacles resulting in a series of renegotiated agreements to deal with security arrangements and further Israeli redeployment from parts of the West Bank. However, Israeli intransigence during the interim period evident in the continued land confiscation and Jewish settlement policies resulted in the collapse of the Oslo peace process and the outbreak of the second Palestinian Uprising after the provocative visit of Ariel Sharon to Al- Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem in September 2000.

Israeli repressive measures during the Uprising resulted in the destruction of big portion of the public institutions built by the PNA during the first years of the Oslo process. The large number of Palestinian casualties³, the destruction of infrastructure, the continued land confiscation and settlement activities, and the building of the unprecedented Separation Wall inside the West Bank, made the revival of the peace process seem to be more distant than ever. The deteriorating economic conditions resulting in record unemployment and poverty levels and the

deadlock in the political process further affected the legitimacy of the nationalists' control of the PNA (led by Fateh) and gave further impetus to the rise of the Islamists to power as a viable and credible alternative, taking into consideration their effectiveness in extending crucial support to large segments of society at a time when the PNA seemed to be ineffective, paralyzed, and corrupt.

In January 2005 Mahmoud Abbas became President of the PNA after winning the majority of votes in presidential elections replacing President Yasir Arafat, who passed away in November of 2004. In September 2005, the Israeli Army completed a unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and evacuated Israeli settlers from the territory.

After a protracted process the second Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections were held on January 25, 2006. The Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) won 74 out of the 132 seats of the newly restructured PLC. On March 29, 2006, Hamas formed its 24-member Cabinet and took charge of the PNA.

Immediately after Hamas won the elections, Israel and the USA led an international campaign to isolate it and started to exert pressure in order to dismantle the Hamas government. All international aid to the PNA was cut and Israel and the US intercepted and halted financial bank transfers from Arab and Islamic countries to the WB&G. Consequently, the deteriorating economic conditions and the inability of the Hamas government to pay the salaries of public sector employees coupled with a Fateh-led strike of a large number of public employees, led to an open confrontation between Hamas and Fateh in the Gaza Strip.

In February 2007, and following an escalation in intra-Palestinian fighting between Hamas and Fateh, the two sides finally agreed, in Mecca, to form a National Unity Government (NUG). The NUG was sworn in on March 17, 2007, headed by Prime Minister Haniyeh from Hamas and with independent Ministers of Finance and Foreign Affairs. Unfortunately, severe fighting between Hamas and Fateh broke out again and in June 2007 Hamas seized full control of Gaza. On June 14, President Abbas dissolved the NUG, declared a state of emergency, and announced the formation of an emergency Palestinian Government headed by Mr. Salam Fayyad as Prime Minister and who also serves as Finance Minister. This left the Palestinian polity and the Palestinian public institutions and ministries created

by the PNA with two rival governments, each with a territorial base, raising the specter of institutionalizing the separation between the WB&G to the demise of Palestinian future aspirations to build a viable state within the geographic framework of these two areas (International Crisis Group 2007).

The effects of Israeli Policies on Palestinian Public Administration

From the outset of its inception, the context of governance for the PNA has been extremely problematic due to the fact that it operated under the framework of the Israeli military occupation and was ultimately subordinate to Israeli sovereignty. This point cannot be overstressed and it is crucial to the understanding of the obstacles that faced the development of the Palestinian public sector during the years of the Oslo process and beyond. Joel Singer (1994), the former Legal Adviser of the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and who is largely responsible for drafting the Oslo DOP, brags about being able to negotiate an accord that preserves the Israeli military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza all throughout the interim period:

The dissolution of the Israeli Civil Administration will have no impact on the status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The Civil Administration was created in the early 1980's as an organ of the Israeli military government in order to discharge the powers and responsibilities of the military government in civilian matters. It should be noted that, prior to the establishment of the Civil Administration, the military government itself had been performing both civilian and non-civilian functions. Thus, with the dissolution of the Civil Administration, the military government will simply resume all the powers and responsibilities of the Civil Administration not transferred to the Palestinian Council. In this context, the fact that the military government in the West Bank and Gaza Strip will continue to exist is very significant. It emphasizes that, notwithstanding the transfer of a large portion of the powers and responsibilities currently exercised by Israel to Palestinian hands, the status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip will not be changed during the interim period. These areas will continue to be subject to military government. Similarly, the continued existence of the military government indicates that the Palestinian Council will not be independent or sovereign in nature, but rather will be legally

subordinate to the authority of the military government. In other words, operating within Israel, the military government will continue to be the source of authority for the Palestinian Council and the powers and responsibilities exercised by it in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. (p. 4)

During the years of its military occupation of the WB&G Israel devised an intricate system of territoriality to aid it in maximizing its control of Palestinians. The use of new and innovative facets of territoriality intensified during the current Palestinian Uprising with devastating effects on Palestinian society including the different institutions of the Palestinian public administration.

A review of the definition of human territoriality highlights the reasons behind Israeli intensified use of it as a prime strategy for control. Robert Sack (1986) defines territoriality as "the attempt by an individual or group to affect, influence, or control people, phenomena, and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area" (p. 19). In this sense, Sack sees territoriality as an "indispensable means to power at all levels: from the personal to the international" (p. 1).

This understanding of territoriality motivated Israeli designs of the spatial limits imposed on PNA jurisdiction during the interim period of the Oslo Accord which divided the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) into three zones: A, B, and C. After the final Israeli redeployment stipulated in the Sharm Al Sheikh Memorandum,⁴ Zone A constituted 17.2% of the total area of the West Bank and was designated to be under the civil and security jurisdiction of the PNA; Zone B constituted 23.8% and was under the civil jurisdiction of the PNA but Israel retained overall responsibility for security; Zone C constituted 59% of the West Bank and included all of the lands outside Palestinian towns and villages and remained under total Israeli control.

Israeli use of territoriality is unprecedentedly comprehensive and has used direct and indirect methods of control, in many cases using misnomers to disguise it: Settlements/Colonies, By-pass Roads, Land Confiscation, Separation Wall, Closed Military Areas, Military Bases, Natural Reserves, Green Areas, House Demolitions, Uprooting of Trees, Control/Depletion of Water Resources, and Environmental Pollution (Water, Air, Soil, Noise, Radiation, and Solid & Hazardous Waste).

Israeli use of territoriality is therefore complicating the spatial context within which the PNA is operating. The WB&G constitute only 22% of the total area of Palestine in its British Mandate boundaries. Israeli Separation Wall (or Apartheid Wall as Palestinians call it) has further fragmented the West Bank into several isolated areas. Palestinian lands remaining east of the Wall constitute only 54% of the total area of the West Bank taking into consideration that the Jordan valley with an area constituting 28.5% of the West Bank is also off limits to Palestinians and can only be accessed with hard-to-obtain permits from the Israeli occupation authorities. About 9.5% of the West Bank area now falls west of the Wall and is under total Israeli control. Settlement blocs within the West Bank that are now within the Wall complex constitute the remaining 8% of the area. The map in Figure 1 explains the effects of the Separation Wall on the territorial contiguity of Palestinian areas and on the demographics of Palestinians living in the West Bank.

There are close to 4 million Palestinians living in the WB&G, of which 2.5 million live in the West Bank and 1.5 million in the Gaza Strip. The population is distributed among 521 local authorities (107 municipalities, 11 local councils, 374 village councils, and 29 refugee camps).⁵ Due to Israeli territorial policies these local authorities are now separated in isolated clusters within the West Bank that many have likened to the Bantustans of the Apartheid regime era in South Africa. In fact, Palestinian areas are more and more resembling actual prisons separated by walls, gates, military checkpoints, and bypass roads that are only accessible to Jewish settlers. This presents the PNA with what can be termed as a governance nightmare, fragmenting its jurisdiction and making it extremely difficult to implement projects on a national scale. In many cases this resulted in what can be described as a forced decentralization policy, not by choice, but by necessity in order to transcend the territorial obstacles imposed by the Israeli military. Although decentralization in governance can be beneficial to public sector management, in the Palestinian case, it restrictively meant only subsistence, due to limited resources at the local level.

The separation between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is another major territorial complexity of governance. Palestinians are forbidden to commute between the two areas. Obtaining permits is almost impossible. The “Safe Passage” provision of the Oslo Accord was not implemented and Israel made it a

point of contention in all of the negotiations that took place in the interim period. The PNA, therefore, had to build headquarters and offices for ministries in both the West Bank and Gaza, replicating services and structures that offer them, further straining the governmental budget.

However, despite this complex spatial context and in order to prove its viability and legitimacy as a pre-state entity the PNA must perform a set of essential functions that ensure the reproduction and maintenance of Palestinian society. It is expected to provide a whole range of public goods and services, facilitate and manage the economy, and mediate conflict between the different groups and interests in society. Imperatively, this means it must build appropriate institutions and apparatuses capable of performing the duties of a modern state.

Currently the PNA is facing major problems and obstacles that will either prevent, or complicate, its ability to perform the civic functions of a state. The PNA is faced with the immense socioeconomic problems caused by the prolonged Israeli military occupation of the WB&G. It has to deal with a devastated Palestinian economy and infrastructure, severe environmental and health problems, undeveloped civil society institutions, and a chaotic political situation marked by sectarianism and ideological factionalism. In spite of these problems, and in order to functionally resemble a state, the PNA must be able to deliver a long list of public goods and services: water and electricity, sewage disposal, telephone services, health facilities, education, independent legal and regulatory agencies, police protection, etc.

During the Oslo process the PNA was able to create a functioning structure of quasi-state institution that can serve as a nucleus for the development of future state institutions. Israel, however, still retains effective control over the provision of many basic services in WB&G including water provision (Israeli Mekorot Company), electric power generation and distribution (Israel Electric Corporation), and postal services. Israel sees control of these services as a direct way to assert its sovereignty over the occupied territories. By preventing the PNA, wholly or partially, from providing these essential services, Israel deprives it from gaining important symbols of sovereignty. Accordingly, Israeli continued control of these services forces the Palestinians to stay depended on her and impedes their drive to statehood.

There are several other factors that will either prevent, or slow, the PNA from performing the essential functions of a state during the coming period. First of all, the Oslo Accords have restricted the jurisdiction of the PNA and the PLC to a degree that could retard the development of viable state institutions. Most of the Israeli military laws before signing the Accords remain in force, and will not be changed without Israeli approval. Article VII (9) of the Cairo Agreement states that “laws and military orders in effect in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area prior to the signing of this Agreement shall remain in force, unless amended or abrogated in accordance with this agreement.”⁶ By agreeing to such a provision the PLO in effect has consented, although not explicitly, to the continuation of the Israeli military occupation. Indeed, the persistence of Israeli military occupation of the WB&G makes the development of viable Palestinian state apparatuses a daunting task. The more than 1,400 Israeli military laws that are still in force in the occupied territories seriously complicate the PNA’s ability to perform its civic duties.

On the economic level, the PNA is facing harsh conditions that are making it extremely difficult to levy enough taxes and in turn deliver the needed services. Israeli continued policy of siege and closure of the WB&G has left the Palestinian economy in shambles. Real per capita income has plummeted; Unemployment reached to 60% and close to 70% of the population is now living below the poverty line.⁷

These conditions changed national priorities and thwarted institutional reform. Focus shifted from strategic planning and medium range planning to emergency schemes to address the social ramifications of the deteriorating economy. The public sector was enlarged on the expense of the private sector and the PNA budget deficit grew to untenable level of US\$800 at the end of 2005 (World Bank 2005).

The PNA’s ability to perform the civic functions of the state is currently hampered by overemphasis on police power. About 20% of the labor force work in the public sector. Out of the 140,000 public employees about 40% work in security-related institutions. Currently security apparatuses of the PNA consume 27% of the budget (Said & Badawi 2004, P. 8). This overemphasis on police power retarded the process of institution-building and harmed the PNA’s legitimacy.

The role of International Donors

The international community was involved in both the creation and then the sustenance of the PNA. International donors were involved in giving start-up funds for the PNA and then financed its operational budget. Much of international aid, however, was tied aid contingent upon PNA adherence to the signed agreement with Israel in the framework of the Oslo Accords, and with structural and administrative reforms asked of the PNA at different junctions in the Oslo process, but in many instances reflecting and accommodating Israeli demands for increased security. At the end of the Oslo interim period and during the current Palestinian Uprising, US aid was used as a pressuring tool to extract political compromise from the Palestinian leadership.

Nonetheless, International donors were involved in a plethora of projects that were implemented through the different ministries of the PNA covering almost all sectors in Palestinian society. Although there were many efforts to coordinate international aid coming into the WB&G, to minimize project duplication, and to make it more in tune with Palestinian strategic and development plans, it remained to a large extent reflecting donor agendas and preferences all throughout the interim period of Oslo. Most of the aid during the Uprising focused on mitigating the effects of the harsh economic conditions and to rebuild devastated infrastructure after the massive Israeli invasions of main cities in the WB&G since 2002. Between 1994 and 2006 the PNA received a total of 6,155,678 USD in grants and 374,012,000 in loans.⁸ Following the inauguration of the Hamas government in March 2006, all international aid was halted and Israel and the US blocked all money transfers to the PNA. Palestinians saw these sanctions as unfair and unjustified since they were ironically a punishment for exercising democracy.

PNA Development and Reform Initiatives

PNA efforts to reform, develop, and modernize the public sector continued throughout the years of the Oslo process and even during the years of the second Palestinian Uprising. These were either a result of indigenous efforts from within the PNA or as a result of demands from international donors, but more importantly in response to growing demands from Palestinian civil society

institutions. Most notably, it led to the restructuring of the PLC and to new national and local elections laws, the restructuring of the executive authority to introduce the position of the Prime Minister and to further delineate the powers of the Presidency, and to fiscal and budgetary reform in an attempt to curb the growing budget deficit.

On the other hand, the PNA initiated national schemes and programs to introduce the concepts of Total Quality Management (TQM) into the performance of the different ministries. Special focus was given to human resource training in the field of administration leading to the creation of the National Institute of Administration (NIA) in 2004. The PNA also established the National Institute for Information Technology (NIIT) to cover a growing public sector need for qualified staff in different fields of IT. Both of the institutes were started by the Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction (PECDAR) and are still under its auspices.

In 2003 and within its efforts to introduce the concepts of e-government into its governance the PNA established a new Ministry for Telecommunications and Information Technology (MTIT). This was followed by the creation of the Government Computer Center (GCC) in the Ministry of Planning which was later put under the auspices of the MTIT. Moreover, most Palestinian ministries have established internet websites.⁹

The PNA has implemented strategic planning and long-term planning into the work of its various ministries; but these gave way to medium-term plans after the collapse of the Oslo peace process and the volatile political and economic conditions during the Palestinian Uprising. The medium-term plans tried to strike a balance between addressing the harsh socioeconomic conditions, reflected in the high levels of unemployment and poverty, and longer-term developmental needs of Palestinian society (MOP 2005).

On the level of the legislative authority, the PLC was able to achieve several milestones, evident in the enactment of the Palestinian Basic Law as a transitional constitution for the PNA pending the drafting of the constitution for an independent Palestinian state in the future. By the end of 2005, the PLC was also able to enact several important laws that had major effects on governance in the WB&G; The most relevant of these laws: National Elections Law, Local Council's Election Law, Local Council's Law, Monetary Authority Law, Civil

Service Law, Public Budget & Financial Affairs Law, Civil Affairs Law, Lawyers Affairs Law, NGOs Law, Labor Law, Natural Resources Law, and Environment Law (Said & Badawi 2004, P. 7).

After Hamas won the elections in January 2006, the work of the PLC was severely disrupted by the Israeli repressive policies. By September 2006, Israel incarcerated more than half of the 74 Hamas parliamentarians who were holding the majority in the 132-seat PLC. The PLC became almost totally paralyzed leaving the Executive Authority without viable oversight from the legislative branch.

Palestinian civil society organizations, however, played an important role in the monitoring and evaluation of the performance of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the PNA. One of the most important initiatives in this regard is the Good Governance Initiative (GGI) which is a “coalition of civil society organizations, academics, and community activists seeking to promote good governance in Palestine through providing citizens with regular, impartial assessments of public sector performance.” The GGI published its first Good Governance Monitoring Report at the end of 2006 giving its assessment of the performance of the President of the PNA, the Ministerial Cabinet, the Ministries of Health and Education, the Ministry of Finance, and the PLC. It is important to note that the period of this report coincided with the period of the 10th government of the PNA led by Hamas, and its findings reflect the complex political and economic situation resulting from the US-Israeli led international embargo of the PNA (GGI 2006). Nonetheless, the GGI and other civil society initiatives that work to monitor and evaluate the performance of the public sector is indeed essential to the reformation and development efforts of the PNA now and in the future.

Conclusions & Recommendations

The Palestinian Public Administration as it is embodied in the PNA is facing almost insurmountable problems and obstacles and has a daunting task to overcome them. For the Palestinian polity to survive, the reunification of the West Bank and Gaza under one functioning government is a logical top priority. This means that Hamas and Fateh have to eventually sit down and hammer out their

differences and reach to a common national agenda that is acceptable to the large majority of Palestinians in the WB&G.

Israeli unprecedented, innovative, and comprehensive use of territoriality as a prime strategy for control, have deliberately devastated the PNA's ability to effectively govern and administer the WB&G and had serious ramifications on the prospects of building viable state apparatuses for Palestinians in the near future.

Israel has to respect the national will of the Palestinian people and accept their democratic choice. The Israeli military occupation has to end on the basis of international legality. Historic events have proved that the creation of an independent and viable Palestinian state is a prerequisite for peace and security and not vice versa. The imposition of security by force without the fulfillment of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people means the continuation of violence and bloodshed.

The International Community's support to the PNA should be freed from its political agendas and should be stopped being used as a tool of political blackmail. This aid should be focused on the vitalization and capacity building of the Palestinian public sector to make it more efficient in delivering higher quality services to Palestinians in the WB&G. International aid should be channeled into projects that are in tune with the philosophy of sustainable development and not those that increase dependency.

The anomalies in the structure of the PNA should be rectified. Over emphasis on security apparatuses should be gradually shifted to other segments in the public sector. Budgetary resources should be allocated to education, health, and the major sectors of the Palestinian economy, most notably agriculture, industry, and tourism.

It is absolutely essential that the PNA and the PLC enact laws and decrees that protect Palestinian natural resources, especially those that can play a major role in the resurrection of Palestinian economy, specifically the natural gas wells off the coast of Gaza.

The continuation of schemes that work to unify the legal environment and laws between the WB&G is particularly necessary. The PLC should be allowed to fully perform its legislative and oversight functions and enact new and responsive laws that govern the performance of the public sector.


Palestinian initiatives to modernize and vitalize the public management systems should be continued and supported. The PNA should foster its implementation of the principles of e-government and TQM and forge an integrated strategy of human resource development using education and training.

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Figure 1. Israeli Separation Wall, source: (PASSIA 2007)



¹ The DOP is also referred to as the PLO-Israel Accord, the Oslo Agreement, and sometimes the Gaza-Jericho First Agreement. The DOP consists of the following documents: (1) the text of the Declaration itself; (2) four annexes dealing, in turn, with elections, early withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, Israeli-Palestinian economic cooperation, and Israeli-Palestinian cooperation at the regional level; and (3) a series of Agreed Minutes amplifying various articles of the Declaration. For a complete text of the DOP see the *New York Times*, Wednesday, September 1, 1993, p. A6.

² Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, Cairo, Egypt, May 4, 1994.

³ In mid 2007, Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories (B'Tselem) reported the number of Palestinians killed during the second Palestinian Uprising to be 4,300.

⁴ “The Sharm el Sheikh Memorandum on Implementation Timeline of Outstanding Commitments of Agreements Signed and the Resumption of Permanent Status Negotiations” was a memorandum signed on September 4, 1999 by Prime Minister of Israel Ehud Barak and PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat at Sharm el Sheikh in Egypt, overseen by the United States represented by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and was witnessed and co-signed by President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and King Abdullah of Jordan.

⁵ For more information and statistics on Palestinian population and local authorities in the WB&G see Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) website: www.pcbs.gov.ps.

⁶ The Cairo Interim Agreement did not explicitly amend or abrogate any of these military laws.

⁷ More detailed statistics on unemployment and poverty rates for the different segments of populations and geographic regions in the WB&G are found in the websites of the Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction (PECDAR) and the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS): www.pecdar.ps, www.pcbs.gov.ps.

⁸ More detailed information on international aid to the PNA can be obtained from the on-line database of the Palestinian Ministry of Planning (MOP): <http://db.mop.gov.ps/amc>.

⁹ For more detailed information on NIA, NIIT, GCC, and MTIT, visit the following websites: www.pecdar.ps, www.gcc.gov.ps, www.mtit.gov.ps.